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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3741 
___________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN JONES, 
           Appellant 
v. 
 
THERESA DELBALSO, Superintendent; JOHN WIEKRYKAS, Records Supervisor  
Common Pleas Court of Berks County; JAMES P. TROUTMAN, Clerk of Court et al, 
others; ELLEN R. WEST, District Attorney's Office; A. TAYLOR WILLIAMS, Chief of 
Litigation; JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Department of Correction; FILOSKY, Right 
to Law Records/Chief Counsel, Governor's Office et al, and others; MAGISTRATE 
JAMES TUPPER, District Justice et al, and others; KELLY M. SEKULA, Attorney 
General Office, Senior Deputy Attorney & Appeals and Legal Service Section; GEORGE 
WAGNER, Warden of Berks County Prison; JOHN DOE, Criminal Records Supervisor 
et al, and others sued individually and in their official capacity; JANE DOE, Criminal 
Records Supervisor et al, and others sued individually and in their official capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-17-cv-04390) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 19, 2018 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, Jr., and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 6, 2018) 
 
OPINION* 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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 Christopher Jones appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  We will summarily affirm because 
no substantial question is presented by this appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Jones, an inmate confined at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy in 
Frackville, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, 
accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis, in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Though difficult to decipher, it appears 
that Jones alleged that (1) two of his convictions have been vacated and that he is thus 
being held illegally, and (2) that his sentence has been incorrectly calculated.1  By order 
entered November 13, 2017, the District Court granted Jones leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis and dismissed his complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The Court held that 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
1 In 1992, Jones was initially sentenced in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to a 
term of ten to twenty years of incarceration for aggravated assault.  While he was serving 
this sentence, Jones was found to be in possession of marijuana, and sentence to five days 
of incarceration.  In 2003, while Jones was serving the remainder of sentence at an 
ADAPPT facility (a halfway house), Jones escaped the facility.  Before Jones was 
apprehended, he committed several sex offenses.  Jones was then convicted of two counts 
of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and sentenced to seven to fourteen years of 
incarceration, to run concurrently.  Jones was also convicted of escape, and sentenced to 
six months to two years of incarceration.  As indicated by a sentence status summary 
prepared by the Department of Corrections and submitted by Jones as an exhibit to his 
complaint, Jones’ controlling minimum date is May 28, 2011, and his controlling 
maximum date is May 28, 2018.  Dkt # 1-3, at 14.   
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Jones’s complaint was barred by Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973), and 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).  Jones appeals.2  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of 
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a 
claim.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “[W]e accept all 
factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 We agree that Jones has failed to state a claim under § 1983 and that the District 
Court correctly dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  It is 
well-settled that when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, 
his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, not § 1983 action.  Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).  Additionally, a state prisoner’s claim for damages 
is not cognizable under § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily 
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the prisoner can show that the 
conviction or sentence has been invalidated.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 
(1994); see also Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). 
                                              
2 Following the District Court’s dismissal order, Jones filed a motion requesting that the 
Court intervene in his PCRA proceedings, which was denied by the District Court.  In his 
subsequent notice of appeal, Jones specifically appeals the District Court’s dismissal 
order, and does not appeal the denial of his motion to intervene.  
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 To the extent that Jones challenges the fact and duration of his confinement, his 
sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, and he is precluded from attacking those 
decisions through § 1983.  See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.  To the extent that Jones seeks 
damages under § 1983 for his allegedly illegal confinement and sentence, a favorable 
outcome would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his incarceration.  Since Jones 
has not successfully challenged his confinement in any state or federal proceeding, he 
may not proceed under § 1983, and his complaint was properly dismissed.  See Heck, 512 
U.S. at 487.3 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
3 Although Jones claims that his two convictions for involuntary deviate sexual 
intercourse (“IDSI”) “have been repealed and deleted as of December 9, 2002,” dkt # 1, 
at 7, nothing in his extensive exhibits suggests that his incarceration is pursuant to an 
expired sentence.  Rather, an exhibit provided by Jones shows that a seven to fourteen 
year sentence for two IDSI convictions was imposed in 2004. 
